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In the last several decades, indigenous communities had to contend with the misappropriation of their 
biological resources and associated traditional knowledge (TK) through the inappropriate exercise of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). The advent of modern biotechnology has intensified this problem 
leaving indigenous communities increasingly vulnerable. As a counter measure, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted in 1992, proclaiming the sovereignty of states over their 
biological resources, and requiring their consent and the equitable sharing of benefits on mutually 
agreed terms as conditions for access. On October 29, 2010, the Nagoya Protocol was adopted to 
implement these provisions. Nevertheless, the CBD has attracted critical comments from those 
opposed to the idea of state sovereignty over biological resources, especially when the exercise of 
sovereignty transcends a state’s territorial borders. Two alternative doctrines; “the common heritage of 
mankind”, and “the global commons”, have been canvassed. This paper set out to analyse these 
arguments together with the alternative doctrines, in order to determine whether state sovereignty over 
biological resources as proclaimed by the CBD is justified. The merits of each doctrine were examined 
against the background of the problems presented to indigenous communities by the trinity of 
biopiracy, IPRs and modern biotechnology. The paper found that the doctrine of state sovereignty over 
biological resources, whilst having its limitations, is not only normatively justified, but is also, 
comparatively more capable of helping to protect the biological resources and associated TK of 
indigenous communities against piracy. 
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In the last several decades, indigenous communities 
have been confronted with biopiracy; that is the 
misappropriation of their biological resources, especially 
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(TK), through the use of IPRs. The advent of modern 
biotechnology has intensified this problem leaving 
indigenous communities increasingly vulnerable. As a 
counter measure, the CBD was adopted in 1992, 
proclaiming the sovereignty of states over their biological 
resources and TK. It mandates the consent of indigenous 
communities and the equitable sharing of benefits with 









Nagoya Protocol was adopted to implement these 
provisions. Nevertheless, the CBD has attracted critical 
comments from those opposed to the idea of state 
sovereignty over biological resources, especially when 
the exercise of sovereignty transcends a state’s territorial 
borders. Two alternative doctrines, “the common heritage 
of mankind”, and “the global commons” have been 
canvassed. 
The paper refers to existing disagreements amongst 
scholars, civil society groups and the courts on plant 
variety rights and patents as they apply to biological 
resources and TK. A number of judicial authorities from 
Australia, the U.S. and Canada are considered which 
only help to highlight the scientific and legal intricacies 
that permeate these protective mechanisms, rendering 
them more favourable to users in foreign countries than 
the indigenous providers of biological resources and TK. 
This analysis leads to the discussion of the CBD 
(including the Nagoya Protocol), which was adopted in 
response to the problem of biopiracy, and in particular, 
the declaration that states have sovereign rights over the 
biological resources in their territories. In discussing the 
doctrine of sovereignty, as enunciated under the CBD, 
the paper looks at opposing viewpoints, which charge 
that the doctrine is overreaching, and therefore unjusti-
fied. Specifically, it assesses the doctrine against two 
alternative propositions, namely the "common heritage of 
mankind" doctrine, and, in particular, the "global 
commons" doctrine. 
The paper also examines the TRIPS Agreement, 
specifically Article 23(7)(b), as well as the Convention for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV, 1961), 
which came into effect in 1968, as amended in1978, and 
1991. The discussion of the TRIPS and UPOV provisions 
is conducted within the context of the contending pro-
visions of the CBD. As a backdrop, the paper examines 
the problem of biopiracy faced by resource-rich indige-
nous communities. It then shows how, in conjunction with 
modern biotechnology, the present intellectual property 
(IP) system, has exacerbated this problem through two 
principal mechanisms, patents and plant breeders' rights, 
which enable individuals, corporations and other 
institutions to pirate the biological resources and TK of 
indigenous communities. The objective of this paper is to 
analyse the arguments already set forth, in order to 
determine whether the doctrine of state sovereignty over 




THE IMPORTANCE OF BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 





microorganisms are central to indigenous community life 
in most developing countries, providing affordable alter-
native means of healthcare and nutrition, in addition to 
employment and income generation. For example in the 
South and South-East Asia; this region of the world 
produces about 90% of global rice, an important staple 
for many Asian families that account for approximately 
80% of daily intake of calories (GRAIN, 1998a) as well as 
significant levels of employment and income. 
Traditional medicinal plants and knowledge of their 
healing properties are also vital to the work of the 
scientific community, and provide important leads for the 
development of new drugs by pharmaceutical companies 
(Mugabe, 1998; Nwabueze, 2007). Collectively, tradition-
al medicines (TMs) command a global market worth of 
approximately USD 60 billion (WHO, 2000; Timmermans, 
2003). Biological resources and TK also provide useful 




Biopiracy and the need to protect biological 
resources and traditional knowledge 
 
Given the importance of biological resources and TK, 
indigenous communities, governments and civil society 
activists clamour for their protection. But the importance 
of these resources and the need for protection gained 
international limelight comparatively recently, following 
the spate of biopiracy witnessed especially in the last 
three decades as illustrated by the Hoodia (Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 2002). In that 
case, scientists at the South African Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR) patented a medicinal 
element (P57) in the hoodia cactus. This is a plant which 
San hunters had traditionally used to suppress hunger 
during hunting expeditions, by chewing it. 
The patent was subsequently licensed to a British 
biotechnology company, Phytopharm. Pfizer later 
obtained rights from Phytopharm for about US$32 million 
to produce and sell P57 as a slimming drug and cure for 
obesity, with a potential income in the region of US$7 
billion. All along, the San people were never informed. 
They were also not compensated, until they threatened to 
sue CSIR upon becoming aware of the piracy of their 
biological resource and TK (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Report, 2002). 
Biopiracy may take several forms. It may arise from a 
patent being granted erroneously for a purported “invent-
tion” derived from prior art, that is, biological resources 
and TK that have long been known to and used by 
indigenous communities; or because the domestic law of 
a state, such as the U.S., does not recognise public 









regulatory laxity, in that a state maintains very low 
patenting criteria; or where a true invention has utilized 
the biological resources and/or TK of indigenous commu-
nities, without obtaining their prior informed consent, or 
providing them fair and equitable compensation 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002).   
 
 
Biotechnology, IPRS and biopiracy 
 
Article 27 (3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement requires Mem-
ber States to grant protection to plant varieties, either by 
patent or under a sui generis system, or a combination of 
both. It, however, does not indicate the nature of the sui 
generis system referred to. Consequently, a controversy 
has emerged between the developed and the developing 
Member States. Whilst the former point to UPOV as the 
sui generis system mentioned in Article 27 (3)(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement, the latter strongly protest that conten-
tion. UPOV (1991) protects the rights of breeders of 
distinct, uniform and stable plant varieties, and its pro-
visions have been incorporated into most national laws. 
 
 
Plant breeders’ rights 
 
The protection of plants through patents and plant breed-
ers’ rights has been much contested, more so, given the 
advent of modern biotechnology. Long before the era of 
classical breeding and especially modern biotechnology, 
farmers in indigenous communities were largely respon-
sible for the domestication of useful medicinal plants, and 
the identification of their chemical properties. 
However, modern biotechnology had profound influenc-
es on indigenous farming rights and practices. It would, 
no doubt, be perverse to pretend about the benefits of 
recent developments in biotechnology. However, it is 
clear that these developments have major implications for 
farmers and indigenous communities. 
Sanderson (2009) vividly explains how modern 
biotechnological developments have helped breeders to 
overcome the comparatively imprecise, time-consuming 
and costly nature of classical breeding. Previously, 
breeders who wanted to achieve certain plant characte-
ristics, such as robust yield, resistance to insects and 
diseases, or rich nutritional content, needed to cross-
breed large amounts of plants over a long period of time, 
with considerable uncertainty of outcome. But with 
genetic engineering, these objectives are more rapidly 
attainable with greater certainty, through targeted gene 
transfers. 
Modern biotechnological developments have simulta-
neously enabled  subsequent  breeders  of  derived  plant  




varieties to undermine the rights of the initial plant 
breeders by substantially copying or “plagiarizing” the 
protected varieties, with insignificant modifications. As 
Sanderson points out, this is made possible by the fact 
that under Article 5(3) of UPOV (1978), subsequent 
breeders do not require the consent of the breeders of 
protected varieties in order to use those varieties to breed 
or market other varieties (Sanderson, 2009). 
Moreover, a derived variety only needs to fulfill minimal 
conditions, in order to be granted its own protection. 
Initially, under Article 6 of UPOV (1961), a new plant 
variety only needed to be distinct, uniform and stable to 
qualify for protection, and according to Article 6 of UPOV 
(1978), the requirement of distinctiveness was met if the 
new variety exhibited at least one important new 
characteristic that differentiated it from a variety (an 
existing, protected variety) commonly known to exist at 
the time when protection is sought. Under Article 1 of 
UPOV (1991), that new characteristic related simply to 
physical, observable characteristics, and it was unneces-
sary to show actual genetic novelty. 
In addition, the word “important” is italicized above 
because in Article 7 of UPOV (1991), it was completely 
removed (Byrne, 1991). Thus, the threshold for protection 
was further reduced. And since the consent of the 
breeder of an existing variety was not required in order to 
use that variety to breed a new one, it became light work 
for competitors to claim protection over an alleged new 
variety, which is actually no more than an artificial 
modification of an existing variety with no genuine 
transformation. For example, a claimant who bred blue 
rice from existing white rice could easily obtain protection 
under this scheme, even if the former shares every other 
physical and genomic characteristics with the latter 
(Guiard, 2001; Sanderson, 2009). 
Combined with the breeders’ exemption, it proved 
inevitably difficult for the breeders of existing varieties to 
challenge abuses of their rights by subsequent breeders, 
because they could only successfully do so if the 
allegedly infringing varieties were identical with their pro-
tected varieties (Sanderson, 2009). Sanderson concluded 
that, modern biotechnology has heightened these 
problems by facilitating the “plagiarism” of existing plant 
varieties with unsettling ease and rapidity. 
Sanderson’s analysis is outlined simply to show that 
the same arguments can analogically be deployed to 
illustrate how plant breeders’ rights themselves, as 
established under UPOV has similarly undermine the 
rights of farming communities. Those communities have 
from time immemorial been responsible for domesticating 
the plants from which plant breeders have developed 
protected varieties with the aid of modern plant genetic 









resources of indigenous communities without authoriza-
tion and compensation, and then seek protection under 
UPOV for cosmetic modifications. 
The unease caused by modern biotechnology and the 
lapses of the plant variety regime coupled with pressures 
from plant breeding groups led to the revision of UPOV 
(1987), and the subsequent adoption of UPOV (1991) 
which amongst other things broadened plant breeders’ 
rights, and permitted the combined ownership of patents 
and plant breeders’ rights (Greengrass, 1991). In 
addition, UPOV (1991) attempted to check the plagiarism 
of protected plant varieties by restricting the scope of the 
breeders’ exemption which would no longer cover acts 
done with the objective of breeding new varieties (Article 
15(1) (iii)). 
For the same reason, Article 14(5)(a)(i) introduced the 
notion of “essentially derived varieties”, that is new 
varieties that are substantially derived from an existing 
variety. Unlike previously, these would no longer be 
protected or exploitable without the consent of the 
breeder of the protected variety (Sanderson, 2009). 
Under Article 14(5)(b), for a new variety to be declared 
as essentially derived from an existing variety, three 
conditions must be cumulatively proven, namely: (a) that 
the new variety was predominantly derived from an 
existing variety or a variety predominantly derived from 
an existing variety while retaining the expression of the 
essential characteristics that resulted from the genotype 
or combination of genotypes of the initial variety; (b) the 
new variety is clearly distinguishable from the initial 
variety; and (c) except for the differences which result 
from the act of derivation, the new variety conforms to the 
initial variety in the expression of the essential characte-
ristics that resulted from the genotype or combination of 
genotypes of the initial variety. 
However, the application of these criteria has proved to 
be problematic, despite the guidelines provided in Article 
14(5)(c) of UPOV (1991), and similar efforts by plant 
breeding organizations in that regard (Sanderson, 2009). 
Matters are made worse by the fact that the phrases, 
“predominantly derived”, “essential characteristics” or 
“conforms to the initial variety” are not defined. 
Furthermore, a breeder who alleges that a subsequent 
variety was predominantly derived from his own bears the 
expectedly intricate task of proving that fact, especially 
where the subsequent breeder has managed to add at 
least an additional characteristic to the new variety. 
More recent attempts have been made to use scientific 
methods, based on physically observable characteristics, 
and molecular characteristics, or a combination of these 
to prove genetic conformity between an existing variety 
and a subsequent one (International Seed Federation, 





by scientists is the, “Jaccard statistical distance”. This is 
used to compare the characteristics of both an initial 
variety and a subsequent variety. If the latter exhibits a 
“genetic distance” of more than 0.96, it is deemed to have 
been essentially derived from the former (International 
Seed Federation, 2005). Another strategy, which was 
propounded by Heckenberger et al. (2005), uses a “code 
of conduct” that has three ranges: below 82%, between 
82 and 90%, and above 90%. If a subsequent variety 
measures a genetic similarity of below 82% with an initial 
variety, there is no presumption of essential derivation. If 
the genetic similarity is between 82 and 90%, there is a 
potential essential derivation. But, if the genetic similarity 
between both varieties measures above 90% then there 
is clearly a case of essential derivation (Sanderson, 
2009). 
Nevertheless, other scientists have faulted these 
quantitative techniques. This is because of the likelihood 
of variability in genetic readings dictated by peculiarities 
of plant species and differences in research methodolo-
gies (Staub, 2005; Rahman et al., 2002). More important 
for the discussion at hand is that a strategy which relies 
on genetic characteristics in order to determine essential 
derivation which could easily be circumvented by 
breeders who creatively select “molecular marker 
profiles” to ensure that the subsequent varieties measure 
below the genetic threshold necessary to trigger a 
declaration of essential derivation. Yet, those subsequent 
varieties may exhibit substantial qualitative similarity with 
existing varieties (Donnenwirth, 2004). 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of the scientific 
approach to the determination of essential derivation, the 
courts, therefore, move beyond the mere assessment of 
the quantity of genetic similarities to also consider the 
qualitative similarities or differences between an existing 
variety and a subsequent one. The courts look to see 
whether a subsequent variety is significantly inventive 
and non-obvious, having regard to functional perfor-
mance and related value to society (Sanderson, 2009). In 
Astée Flowers versus Danziger ‘Dan’ Flower farm (2005), 
the Hague Civil Court adopted this approach in resolving 
a dispute between two breeders and holders of European 
Community plant variety rights in relation to the 
Gypsophila plant variety. It considered the differences in 
the observable physical traits, as well as the structural 
configuration of both varieties, and held that, the 
differences were so significant as to justify the finding that 
the plaintiff had carried out a genuine breeding. The court 
rejected the defendant’s counterclaim that the plaintiff’s 
variety was an essential derivation. 
Again, for indigenous communities whose biological 
resources have been pirated and utilized in the breeding 









saged. First, if the test of essential derivation were 
applied, given the advances in modern biotechnology, 
plant breeders could still manipulate their breeding 
processes and effectively evade the threshold necessary 
to have their supposedly new varieties declared as 
essential derivations, even though they may be only 
minor adaptations of plants that were originally bred by 
indigenous communities. 
Secondly, indigenous communities are largely 
strangers to the IP system, and are ill-equipped to meet 
the qualitative test applied by the courts to prove 
essential derivation. The truth, however, is that the 
criteria for obtaining rights over plant varieties derived 
from those initially bred by indigenous communities are 
less stringent, as plant breeders only need to show that 
they have derived distinct, uniform and distinct varieties. 
And distinctiveness is proven by identifying at least one 





As earlier noted, apart from protection under Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), 
Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO 
Members to protect plant varieties through patents, sui 
generis systems or a combination of both. Of course, 
based on UPOV (1991), it is now possible to seek both 
plant variety rights and patents for new varieties of plant. 
Once again, a vital question is whether plant modifica-
tions are inventive enough to merit patent protection. 
Until recent times, plant varieties did not qualify for 
patent protection because they were considered 
incapable of meeting the criteria of inventiveness, non-
obviousness and disclosure. Also, it was thought impro-
per to grant monopoly rights over plant varieties in view 
of their communal significance (Llewelyn, 1997). Instead, 
plant breeders’ rights under the UPOV system were 
conceived to cater for the interests of breeders of new 
plant varieties (Rimmer, 2003). 
But the threats faced by breeders of existing plant 
varieties as a result of the problems associated with the 
UPOV regime, and the pressures of modern biotechno-
logy led to the gradual but steady movement toward the 
patenting of plants, in addition to micro organisms and 
transgenic animals like oncomouse (Edelman, 1988). 
Nevertheless, thinking on this issue among scholars, 
courts and civil society organizations remains riddled with 
controversy. 
In the U.S. case of JEM Ag Supply Inc versus Pioneer 
Hi-Breed International Inc, where farmers’ unions, 
corporations, cereal trade associations, the biotechnology 
industry,  IP  lawyers,  the  American  Bar,  and  the  U.S. 




Government pitched tents on one side, or the other, the 
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that utility 
patents could be granted to protect plants, in addition to 
protection under the Plant Patent Act (PPA, 1930) and 
the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA, 1970). But the 
minority sharply opposed this view, holding that the 
existence of both those Acts evidenced a legislative 
intendment to exclude plants from the Patent Act (1952). 
They explained that the PPA (1930) was only meant to 
protect new and distinct plant varieties, other than a 
tuber-propagated plant that had been discovered and 
asexually reproduced, such as plants reproduced through 
grafting. In view of this, according to the minority, plants 
did not fall within the ambit of “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter”, as used in the Utility Patent 
Statute, which was amended by the PPA (1930). 
Relying on the dissenting decision of Justice Brennan 
in Diamond v Chakrabarty, the minority explained that life 
forms were outside the categories of patentable 
inventions, pointing out that the Patent Act (1952) should 
be construed in light of the PPA (1930) and the PVPA 
(1970). In Chakrabarty, the majority had held that live, 
man-made microorganisms were patentable under the 
U.S. Patent Act (1952) as being “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof”. 
Likewise, in the Australian case of Grain Pool of 
Western Australia v Commonwealth, the majority of the 
High Court adopted the reasoning of the majority of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty, and decided that 
plant varieties could be protected by patents as 
inventions under the intellectual property power provided 
in Section 51(18) of the Australian Constitution. The High 
Court likened a plant variety having distinct, stable and 
uniform characteristics to an invention, and a plant 
breeder to an inventor. Continuing the analogy, the Court 
compared the requirements of “distinctiveness, uniformity 
and stability” under the Plant Variety Rights Act (1987) 
and the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act (1994) to “novelty and 
inventiveness” in patent law; just as it compared “com-
mon knowledge” and “recent exploitation” respectively, to 
“prior art” and “secret use” in patent law. 
In the Canadian case of Harvard College versus 
Commissioner of Patents, the Canadian Supreme Court 
had to decide whether a transgenic mammal, 
oncomouse, was patentable. This case also aroused 
intense societal interest, with contributions from religious, 
environmental and animal rights groups as amici curiae. 
In the end, the majority of the Court held that oncomouse 
was not a patentable subject matter under the Canadian 
Patent Act (PA, 1985). The majority emphasized that the 
patenting of higher life forms was very contentious, and 










The Court maintained that it could not bring about such 
a radical change, unless there was an express legislative 
endorsement. It added that the existence of the Plant 
Breeders’ Rights Act (PBRA, 1990) suggested that the 
legislature did not intend to extend protection to higher 
life forms under the Patent Act. Instead the PBRA, the 
Court noted, was designed to be a more appropriate 
mechanism to cater for plant materials and other 
products of biotechnology. 
The minority, nevertheless, rejected these arguments. 
It insisted that biological inventions fell within the 
language of “manufacture” and “composition of matter” 
under the PA, and that the PBRA did not preclude the 
patenting of plants under that Act. In fact, both rights, the 
minority maintained, could be held together. The minority 
also pointed out that oncomouse had already been 
patented in other jurisdictions, including the U.S. and the 
European Union, leaving Canada as the only comparable 
jurisdiction to take a different view. 
No doubt, arguments in support of the patenting of life 
forms are eloquent. In fact, the decision in Oncomouse 
alarmed many observers in Canada, including those in 
government circles. Notwithstanding, the truth may lean 
toward the majority view in Oncomouse, as well as the 
minority view in both JEM Ag Supply Inc, and Grain Pool, 
which doubt the propriety of such a step. To appreciate 
this, one only needs to remember the reasons why, 
historically, such a step was not accommodated. Plants, 
in particular, were considered incapable of meeting the 
requirements of patent law. Extending patents to plants 
was also perceived as controversial, given their 
communal importance; a point broadly reaffirmed by the 
majority in Oncomouse. 
The movement toward the patenting of life forms, as 
Edelman observes, has only come about as a result of 
the pressures from commercial interests, propelled by 
modern biotechnology, mostly in the West (Edelman, 
1988). Indeed, the above cases unearth the controversy 
engendered by the IP system, and the potential threats it 
poses to the holders of biological resources and TK, 
which are worsened by modern technological advances. 
Individuals, research institutes, pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological companies hunt for microorganisms and 
plants in indigenous communities, which they exploit for 
largely commercial purposes, under exclusive rights 
obtained through plant variety and patent laws. 
In many cases, these rights are claimed based on 
purely superficial adaptations of biological resources that 
have been historically nurtured by indigenous commu-
nities, and which, in no way, come close to inventions 
that justify the granting of exclusive of IP rights. Apart 





South and South-East Asia help to demonstrate this 
point. One such case involves Ilang-ilang flowers which, 
a French fashion company, Yves St. Laurent, previously 
imported from the Philippines. It later established its own 
farm, where it bred Ilang-ilang flowers that were 
developed from the species it had imported from the 
Philippines. These flowers were subsequently used to 
prepare a perfume formula for which it successfully 
obtained a patent (GRAIN, 1998a). 
Even if Yves St. Laurent invested some intellectual 
effort in preparing its perfume formula, that does not 
negate biopiracy. This is because the formula was based 
on resources that were already in the public domain, and 
obtained without any benefit-sharing arrangements 
(GRAIN, 1998a). Another case involves plan-noi, a plant 
grown in Thailand, which has active ingredients, with 
healing properties that are well known to the Thais. 
Sankyo, a Japanese company, extracted active ingre-
dients from these plants, which it obtained from Thailand, 
and patented them as “Plaonol”. These are later sold as 
tablets called “Kelnac”, for the treatment of ulcers 
(GRAIN, 1998a). 
Similarly, although tempeh, a Vitamin B12-rich health 
food processed through the fermentation of soybeans, 
has long been associated with the people of Java in 
Indonesia, Japan has granted several patents on the 
process of making this product. Still another incident 
involved the bitter gourd, which is a plant grown in 
Thailand. Thai scientists had been working on this plant, 
which they found to contain compounds that could be 
active against HIV/AIDS. However, to their dismay, 
American scientists not only copied their research work, 
but also patented an active protein from a native Thai 
strain of the bitter gourd (GRAIN, 1998a). These 
incidents show how the IP system and modern biotech-
nology facilitate the misappropriation of the biological 
resources and TK of indigenous communities. Even if 
genuine inventions were proven, it is still an important 
question whether that excuses the appropriation of the 
biological resources of indigenous communities, without 
their consent and benefit-sharing arrangements. 
In addition, it can be seen that the conditions stipulated 
for the granting of patents and plant variety rights would 
be more easily met by users of biological resources in 
technologically advanced countries, rather than indige-
nous providers in technologically poor countries. Thus, 
both regimes favour the owners of technologies, rather 
than the holders of the biological raw materials, which are 
adapted through the application of those technologies 
(Overwalle, 2005). 
For example, patents require inventiveness, novelty, 
and industrial applicability, whereas biological raw 









they novel, generally speaking, having been in the public 
domain and transmitted between generations (Cottier and 
Panizzon, 2004). Also, the patent system typically 
protects the rights of a private individual inventor, or a 
group of inventors, rather than collective rights, which 
characterize indigenous resources and TK (Posey and 
Dutfield, 1998). In the same way, plant breeders’ rights 
are granted to breeders of plant varieties that are 
considered distinct, uniform and stable, and not to the 
natural parent plants in general that belong to indigenous 
communities (Overwalle, 2005).  
These requirements are more compatible with the level 
of technology already attained by Western and other 
foreign users, rather than that of the indigenous commu-
nities, which own the biological resources, and are 
responsible for improving them and identifying their 
therapeutic properties (Blackeney, 1998). Added to 
these, are the costs of acquiring IPRs, and of monitoring 
infringements, as well as of enforcing rights, which are 
unaffordable to indigenous communities. 
Put together, these factors clearly show that the IP 
system either way, does not sit well with the interests of 
indigenous communities. On the one hand, indigenous 
communities cannot meet the requirements for obtaining 
IPRs, and on the other hand, the system enables 
foreigners to obtain and exploit their biological resources 
without their consent and appropriate compensation. The 
biological resources of indigenous communities are 
treated like the “common heritage of mankind”, with free 
access to all and sundry (Brush, 2003).  
 
 
THE CBD (STATE SOVEREIGNTY) VERSUS 
“COMMON HERITAGE” AND “GLOBAL COMMONS” 
 
The doctrine of common heritage of mankind 
 
The notion of “common heritage” has been traced to a 
certain Ambassador Pardo, who in 1967, used the term 
to describe places like the Antarctica, outer space, the 
ocean bed and the resources they contain (Brody, 2010). 
And for a while, the notion was also espoused by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), with regard to 
genetic resources relevant to food and agriculture, as can 
be seen in Article 1(1) of its International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (1983), 
which stated that the Undertaking was based on “the 
universally accepted principle that plant genetic resourc-
es are a common heritage of mankind and consequently 
should be available without restriction” (Brody, 2010). 
This means that nobody can claim sovereignty over those 
resources. 
But this notion, in combination with the lopsided  nature  




of the IP system, the advances in modern biotechnology 
and the accompanying spate of biopiracy, grossly 
disadvantaged indigenous communities, since the impli-
cation was to place their resources squarely at the 
disposal of technologically developed user countries. 
Therefore, just as the challenges posed by those who 
bred subsequent plant varieties from existing protected 
varieties led to calls by plant breeders’ rights holders for 
the better protection of their rights through changes in the 
prevailing plant variety regime, indigenous communities 
and their supporters started to clamour for the protection 
of their own resources and TK from misappropriation by 
the holders of plant breeders’ rights and patents. 
Consequently, the common heritage notion was reviewed 
and eventually jettisoned with the adoption of the CBD 
(Overwalle, 2005; Brody, 2010). 
 
 
The Doctrine of State Sovereignty over Biological 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
 
In its preamble, the CBD affirms that states have 
sovereign rights over their biological resources, while 
Article 3 acknowledges their rights to exploit those 
resources, subject to the provisos stated therein. As a 
direct biopiracy counter measure, Article 1 outlines three 
objectives, the third of which mandates the equitable 
sharing of the benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources. 
The principle of equitable sharing is further elaborated 
in Article 15(7), which requires appropriate measures to 
be taken for the purposes of sharing, in a fair and 
equitable manner, the results of research and develop-
ment and the benefits arising from the commercial and 
other uses of genetic resources with provider countries. 
In furtherance of the equitable sharing objectives, Article 
15(5) provides that, unless otherwise determined by 
them, access to genetic resources are subject to the prior 
informed consent of provider countries. This consent is to 
be based on full and complete information given by the 
prospective genetic resource user, prior to the granting of 
access to the genetic resource (Glowka, 1994). 
Also, based on the sovereign rights of states over their 
biological resources, Article 15(1) states that the right to 
grant access rests with national governments in provider 
countries, and is subject to their national legislation. And, 
in order to ensure the equitable sharing objective stipu-
lated in Article 15(7), Article 15(4) provides that access 
where granted should be on the basis of terms mutually 
agreed between the provider country and the user of the 
genetic resources. The Article 15 principles are also 
repeated in the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 









adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the CBD on 
April 19, 2002 in The Hague, Netherlands. 
Apart from genetic resources, the CBD in Article 8(j) 
also attempts to protect the TK of indigenous 
communities by requiring each signatory to respect such 
knowledge and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits derived from its use. Following the adoption of 
the CBD, Annex III was introduced into the FAO’s 
International Undertaking, which affirmed that the notion 
of “common heritage”, as used in the Undertaking, is 
subject to the sovereignty of states over their genetic 
resources (Brody, 2010). 
 
 
The Nagoya protocol to the CBD (2010) 
 
On October 29, 2010, the Conference of the Parties to 
the CBD adopted a Protocol in Nagoya, Japan meant to 
implement the provisions of the CBD, especially Article 
15, thereof. The Protocol in its preamble, further reaffirms 
the sovereignty of states over their natural resources, and 
stresses the importance of benefit-sharing on mutually 
agreed terms. 
According to Article 5 of the Protocol, benefits from the 
use of genetic resources and associated TK, including 
their applications are to be shared in a fair and equitable 
manner, based on mutually agreed terms between 
providers and users, in accordance with Article 15 of the 
CBD. Furthermore, each Party is to take legislative, 
administrative and policy measures to implement these 
provisions. Article 6 reiterates that access to genetic 
resources is to be based on the prior informed consent of 
the providers, in the exercise of their sovereignty, and in 
accordance with their domestic access and benefit-
sharing laws. Each Party is also required to ensure that 
the consent of indigenous communities is duly obtained 
and that they are involved in the process. 
Equally important are Articles 15 and 16, which require 
each Party to ensure that genetic resources and TK used 
in its territory have been obtained based on prior inform-
ed consent and equitable benefit-sharing on mutually 
agreed terms in accordance with the domestic laws of the 
other Party. Each Party is also take appropriate, effective 
and proportionate measures to cooperate and provide 
redress in situations of non-compliance with these 
requirements. 
Under Article 18, Parties are required to encourage 
providers and users of genetic resources and TK to 
include as part of their mutually agreed terms, dispute 
settlement mechanisms, including arbitration and media-
tion. They are also to ensure that an opportunity to seek 
redress is available under their legal systems in disputes 






The doctrine of global commons 
 
Nevertheless, the CBD has come under criticism. For 
example, the U.S. refused to sign the Convention 
because of reservations over its impact on businesses 
and IPRs. In particular, the requirements of prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing arrangements, which have 
been introduced, based on the CBD, into the IP law of 
some developing countries, such as India, as well as 
those in the African Union (AU) and the Andean 
Community, as conditions for recognizing IPRs, have 
also been criticized as being incompatible with TRIPS 
(Article 27(3)(b)). 
Moreover, in a recent commentary, Brody (2010) 
attacked the notion of state sovereignty over genetic 
resources, which underpins the CBD. Although Brody 
acknowledges that states, as a result of their territorial 
sovereignty, can control access to biological resources 
within their borders, and claim part of the benefits derived 
from them, he objects to the extension of that power to 
cases where information was obtained, or a patented 
material was used outside a state’s territory. 
What Brody is advocating, in other words, is the “global 
commons” doctrine. As he describes it, this doctrine 
treats biological resources just like any other resources. 
Unlike the common heritage doctrine, it allows research-
ers who use genetic information to make useful products 
to patent those products. Also, unlike the state 
sovereignty doctrine, it allows researchers to use 
biological material found outside a state’s territory, for 
example, in seed banks, to conduct studies in order to 
obtain genetic information for the making of patentable 
products, without being under any obligation to share the 
resulting benefits with the state of origin of the biological 
material. 
Brody points to a clause in Decision 391 of the Andean 
Community “Common Regime on Access to Genetic 
Resources” (1996), which states that Members may 
institute actions requesting the nullification of IPRs over 
genetic resources and associated products that were 
obtained or developed through an access activity that 
does not comply with the provisions of the Decision, and 
casts doubts over its viability or justification. 
In an apparent support of these claims, Brody alludes 
to an assertion by GRAIN, an NGO (GRAIN, 1998a) that 
whilst the CBD and the notion of state sovereignty which 
it propagates may hold sway within a state’s internal 
borders, in a clash between a sovereign state and a 
foreign IPR holder, the state’s jurisdiction cannot trump 
the IPR holder. 
In addition, he refers to the view expressed by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC, 2006) that the 









create any new property rights in genetic resources, or 
nullify other possible rights, presumably, IPRs. Instead, it 
only restates the traditional principle that sovereign states 
have the power to control what takes place in their 
territory. Thus, states can only control access to 
biological resources within their internal borders. 
Finally, Brody relies on a remark credited to another 
NGO (Third World Network, 2001) to the effect that since 
TRIPS does not require prior informed consent as a 
condition for granting IPRs, it does not recognise the 
rights of a state, which hosts biological resources or the 
knowledge of their use. Therefore, applicants can seek 
for, and patent offices can grant IPRs over such re-
sources or knowledge, without verifying whether they 
have obtained the prior informed consent of the host 
state.  
Based on these sources, Brody contends that state 
sovereignty should not extend to actions performed 
outside a host state on biological resources obtained 
outside that state. He illustrates this with the example that 
if a biological material has been “lawfully”, obtained from 
a host state and deposited in an international repository 
for plants and animals, there should be no basis for the 
exercise of state sovereignty.  
Brody argues, that in all these cases, it is the 
sovereignty of the state in which the use take places that 
is violated, and not that of the host state. Thus, once a 
genetic material has been removed overseas, state 
sovereignty is inapplicable. 
Therefore, according to Brody, by seeking to extend 
state sovereignty to cover these instances, beyond those 
occurring within the internal borders of a host state, the 
CBD is overreaching, and demands further justification. 
He charges that this doctrine is at odds with the 
interdependence of states, because states are likely to 
manage their genetic resources in self-serving ways 
without due attention to how their actions impact the rest 
of the world. In view of all this, Brody suggests that the 




Examining the concept of sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty is one of the most contested concepts in 
political science. Since its emergence in political science 
discourse, the concept has persistently defied a 
universally accepted meaning (Oppenheim, 1928). Some 
scholars (Krasner, 1989) have doubted its continued 
relevance in contemporary International Relations (IR), 
whilst others (Camilleri and Falk, 1993) have gone as far 
as to declare its demise.  
Without doubt, the concept of sovereignty has evolved 
over time, in step with historical  changes,  culminating  in  




corresponding shifts in its significance for states and IR. 
The advent of economic globalization, the rise of 
supranational bodies such as the UN, the EU, and the 
WTO, in addition to INGOs, as well as the global 
enforcement of human rights, have tended to circum-
scribe state sovereignty (Brahm, 2004). Nevertheless, it 
seems unduly hasty to proclaim its end and to seek to 
consign it to the rubbish bin of history. After all, states 
have continued to rely on the concept to justify their 
freedom to act within their internal borders, and their 
independence from embarrassing foreign interference 
(Fowler and Bunck, 1995). 
Thus, putting aside its ever changing nature, 
sovereignty may be said to denote the power of a state 
with a government, a people, and a defined territory to do 
everything necessary to govern itself, including the 
making, the execution, and the application of laws, in 
both civil and criminal matters, free of unwarranted 
interference from other states or foreign actors; it is a 
state’s exclusive right of control over persons, things and 
activities in its territory (Brahm, 2004). 
Since the power of a state to make, adjudicate and 
enforce laws, otherwise called jurisdiction, is based on 
sovereignty, that power has traditionally been territorially 
limited (Blakesley, 1999). Several reasons underlie the 
territorial limitation of jurisdiction. One of these is to 
ensure uniformity and certainty in the way states use 
jurisdiction, and in that way, avoid the kind of arbitrary-
ness that would lead to the abuse of legal processes and 
individual rights. Another reason is to preserve 
international orderliness by preventing clashes between 
states seeking to assert jurisdiction (Bassiounni, 1999). 
In the Lotus, the dissent, Judge Altamira, observed that 
one of the most generally accepted principles of 
international law is the territorial nature of jurisdiction. 
This being so, the learned Judge thought it unacceptable 
and unwarranted for a court, on the basis of its domestic 
law, to seek to exercise jurisdiction over an alien outside 
its territory, for acts committed outside that territory. The 
only exception to the territorial limitation of jurisdiction 
related to instances of criminal conduct by a state’s 
citizens abroad, under the “active personality principle” 
(Havard Research in International Law, 1935). 
Over time, however, there has been a shift toward the 
extraterritorial application of national laws. This happens 
where the conduct in question, even if it occurred outside 
a state’s territory, produces some harmful effect in that 
territory (“protected interest” or “objective territoriality” 
principle), or if it harms its citizens (“passive personality” 
principle) (Blakesley, 1999). 
No doubt, the unrestrained exercise of jurisdiction can 
lead to the harassment of individuals and the rupture of 









Still, a careful examination of the jurisdictional rules 
already cited to, would show that there is a reasonable 
basis for the extraterritorial enforcement of a state’s 
sovereign rights over its biological resources and TK. As 
explained, biopiracy involves the misappropriation of the 
resources and TK of indigenous communities. These are 
interests of important social, cultural and economic value, 
not only to the immediate indigenous communities that 
harbour them, but to the state or society at large.  
Viewed in this way, piracy can be said to injure a 
state’s interests and, therefore, in defense of such 
interests, an affected state can seek to sanction such 
conduct, even where it occurs outside its territory. This is 
the principle of protective interest, of which the CBD is 
arguably an affirmation. Thus, where biological resources 
or TK have been pirated and exploited abroad, the harm 
thereby done to a state’s interest is a sufficient 
connecting factor for the affected state to protect that 
interest extraterritorially. This can be by way of a petition 
before the appropriate department, such as the Patent 
Office, in a foreign state seeking to nullify whatever rights 
may have been acquired through the use of such 
resources or TK, or through litigation in the foreign court. 
Thus, in the Neem Case (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Report, 2002), India successfully 
petitioned the United States Patent and Trade Mark 
Office (USPTO), as well as the European Patent Office 
(EPO), and secured the nullification of patents that were 
wrongly granted to a U.S. company, W.R. Grace. This 
was because the patents were based on products made 
from pirated extracts from the neem tree that had been 
bred through traditional Indian plant breeding system, 
and whose chemical properties the Indians had long 
recognised. 
Again, in the Tumeric Case (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Report, 2002), India successfully secured 
the nullification of a patent that had been granted to two 
Indian nationals in the U.S. by the USPTO over the use 
of the tumeric plant in the healing of wounds. The reason 
was that the patent was based on pirated TK, already 
well established in Indian traditional medicine. 
As it were, these cases arose under the IP system. If 
states can successfully protect their interests in biological 
resources and TK against abuses of IPRs further ashore, 
it is difficult to understand why the extraterritorial 
enforcement of the same interests, as reinforced by the 
CBD, should be viewed differently. In any case, based on 
Articles 15, 16 and 18 of the Nagoya Protocol, states 
whose resources and TK have been pirated in violation of 
their domestic laws are entitled to seek redress, and 
other states are obliged to cooperate and provide appro-
priate opportunities for such redress. 





reign rights of states to their biological resources and TK 
under the CBD is unpersuasive. As has been cogently 
argued (De Carvalho, 2000; Tobin and Barber, 2003), 
insofar as Article 8 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement permits 
Member States to take appropriate measures to prevent 
the abuse of IPRs, a state can sanction any taking of its 
biological resources or TK, whether directly, or indirectly, 
in violation of its laws requiring prior informed consent 
and benefit sharing. 
Equally, they have the right to apply their domestic 
legislation in preventing IPRs from being exercised in 
ways that conflict with their healthcare requirements, of 
which biological resources and TK are an essential part. 
Additionally, based on Paragraph 4 of the Doha 
Declaration, TRIPS should not only be interpreted, but 
also implemented in ways that are consistent with the 
rights of other Member States. That Declaration affirmed 
that IPRs should not undermine the developmental needs 
of developing Member States, and acknowledged the 
importance of broadening the task of the TRIPS Council 
to cater for the protection of TK. 
Furthermore, if it is argued that the requirement that 
applicants for IPRs should disclose the source of origin of 
biological resources or TK that have been used, or proof 
of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing 
arrangements, as a substantive element of state 
legislation, are contrary to TRIPS, that requirement could 
alternatively be viewed as a procedural one within the 
rubrics of Article 62 of the TRIPS Agreement, which talks 
of “reasonable procedures” (Hassemer, 2004). 
For the avoidance of doubt, this is not the only instance 
where states have tried to pursue their interests 
extraterritorially in recent times. The antitrust laws of the 
U.S. are known to have extraterritorial effect. In fact, 
attempts by the U.S. Justice Department to enforce U.S. 
antitrust laws were one perceived as amounting to 
intolerable invasion of the sovereignty of the U.K., 
compelling the Government to pass the Protection of 
Trading Interest Act of 1980 (Blythe, 1983). Another 
glaring example is the Special Section 301 of the Trade 
Act, 1974. The Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) by placing foreign states on 
differentiated Watch Lists pressurizes them to control 
what it considers the harmful pirating and counterfeiting 
of American products, and also dissuades them from 
invoking compulsory licences that are considered to 
threaten the interests of American pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Therefore, contrary to Brody’s comments, where scien-
tists or institutions and corporations use the knowledge of 
indigenous communities, or their biological resources, 
whether obtained directly or laundered through appa-









to challenge by the affected state. To argue the opposite 
would lead to the untenable result that an act of piracy 
ceases to be unlawful because the pirated material has 
successfully been removed from the host state to a 
foreign state where it is being exploited. Apart from the 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol, that action could be 
caught by the doctrine of “unclean hands”. 
In Keystone Driller Company versus general Excavator 
Company, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that if the 
conduct of a party is so offensive to the dictates of natural 
justice, whatever rights he may hold and however he may 
apply them at law, the court of equity will not afford him 
any remedy. Undeniably, the pirating of the biological 
resources and TK of indigenous communities is fore-
boding. It threatens their survival, and is inequitable. 
Brody’s arguments relating to central depositories bring 
to mind the activities of the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, an arm of the Consul-
tative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR), which functions under the World Bank. IIRI 
initially collected seed varieties from farming communities 
in Asia at the beginning of the 1960s, for research 
purposes alleged to be beneficial to poor communities. 
Ironically, however, a disproportionate amount of the 
benefits accruing from IRRI’s activities are being 
channelled to Western plant breeders, who get almost 
exclusive access to IRRI’s collection of seed varieties 
from which they develop the so-called “new varieties”. 
For example, records indicate that about three-quarters 
of U.S. rice harvest are from varieties supplied by IRRI. 
These supplies enrich rice producers in the U.S., 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand by about USD 655 
million annually, whilst many go hungry in South and 
South-East Asian communities (GRAIN, 1998a). 
Furthermore, where biological resources or information 
have been pirated and exploited in a foreign state, it is 
not the sovereignty of the foreign state that is violated as 
Brody claims. This is because the pirated material does 
not belong to that state. Rather, it is the sovereignty of 
the state where the pirated material or TK originated that 
has been violated, and that state has the greatest interest 
in sanctioning such misconduct. Under the Nagoya 
Protocol, the latter state also has a duty to cooperate in 
such cases. 
The fact that these protection regimes; patents and 
plant varieties, favour the users of biological resources, 
rather than their holders, helps to explain why neither the 
common heritage of mankind doctrine nor its global 
commons counterpart, is in the interest of the holders of 
such resources and the associated TK. This is because 
the predictable result would be the plundering of the 
biological resources of indigenous communities, and the 
laundering   of  such  resources  through  minor  scientific  




tinkering, masquerading as ‘’genetic engineering’’ or 
“invention”, which are economically exploited through 
patents or plant breeders’ rights. 
These facilities are mainly available to the users of 
biological resources, who pay no compensation to their 
traditional custodians. This is not only morally unjust, but 
is also illegal in that it violates other international instru-
ments, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007), which recognises and esta-
blishes the rights of indigenous peoples over their 




Conflict between the CBD and TRIPS 
 
Without doubt, there is a conflict between the CBD and 
TRIPS, and this problem must be tackled. The CBD 
fosters the interests of developing countries, and the 
protection of biodiversity, while TRIPS aims to protect the 
private interests of corporations, mainly in developed 
countries (Jungeurt and Meyer, 2006). Unlike the CBD, 
TRIPS does not accommodate the idea of state’s 
sovereignty over their biological resources, neither does it 
mandate access based on the consent of holders and the 
equitable sharing of benefits with them. In fact, it does the 
opposite by facilitating biopiracy. Yet, a purposeful 
reading of the TRIPS provisions, including Articles 7, 
8(1), 30 and 73, would show that TRIPS and IPRs can 
serve broader societal objectives, beyond the protection 
of corporate interests. The Doha Declaration of 
November 2001, and the August 2003 Decision are a 
further affirmation of this point. 
Developing countries should interpret TRIPS flexibly, 
and effectively incorporate the CBD provisions into their 
domestic laws. They should exclude the patenting of their 
biodiversity. Developing countries should form a united 
front, and not succumb to attempts by developed 
countries to expand the reach of TRIPS, such as by 
advancing the UPOV model of sui generis protection as 
the only possible mode of protection (Sahai, undated). 
They should continue to campaign, at appropriate fora, 
with the support of civil society groups, for a redefinition 
of the scope of TRIPS. The ultimate goal should be to 
accord priority to the provisions of the CBD, which in 
Article 22, excuses Parties from carrying out their 
obligations under any other treaty, such as TRIPS, where 
to do so would endanger biodiversity (Sahai, undated). 
 
 
Shortcomings of the CBD and the Nagoya protocol 
 









shortcomings. It provides for prior informed consent and 
the payment of compensation to indigenous communities. 
But practical problems of compliance could arise because 
biological resources and associated TK may be held by 
different indigenous practitioners and communities, often 
dispersed across geographical borders. This presents 
difficulty to foreign users as to how to determine the 
actual right-holding community and the members of such 
a community. In the Hoodia, Phytopharm’s excuse for not 
informing the San was that it had made several enquiries, 
but was unsuccessful in locating the people, who were 
believed to be sheltering in tents far removed from their 
tribal homelands (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights Report, 2002). Moreover, it is not clear who may 
represent indigenous communities in access and benefit-
sharing discussions. 
Additionally, the validity of sui generis protection sys-
tems is, generally, territorially limited (Dinwoodie, 2005), 
whereas the misappropriation of biological resources and 
TK can occur overseas, thus weakening such options, 
and presenting problems of enforcement (Timmermans, 
2003). Some of the above issues are addressed in the 
Nagoya Protocol. But it must immediately be noted that 
although the Protocol marks some progress in the 
protection of the biological resources and TK of 
developing countries, a good number of the provisions 
are weaker than developing countries had bargained for. 




OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
As already pointed out, Article 5 of the Protocol provides 
for the equitable sharing of benefits resulting from 
biological resources and their subsequent uses. Here, 
developing countries can indicate in their domestic laws 
minimum requirements that can be considered to meet 
the condition of equitable sharing (Nijar, 2011). 
They should also ensure that their obligation to grant 
access are properly matched with the corresponding 
obligation on the part of developed countries to ensure 
compliance and contribute to technological diffusion, as 
well as funding (Nijar, 2011). The issue of technology 
transfer is pertinent because the Protocol unfortunately 
undermines the related provision in Article 16(4) of the 
CBD.  Developing countries should try to restore that 
provision through a decision of the Conference of the 
Parties acting as a Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) 
(Nijar, 2011). 
Of significance is the WHO Agreement reached in April, 
2011 on the sharing of viruses and vaccines. That Agree-





previous arrangement, which was seriously challenged 
by Indonesia. Developing countries had been asked to 
relinquish ownership over influenza viruses, which are 
part of their genetic resources, and to grant automatic 
access. They deposited these viruses at WHO centres, 
which are all located in developed countries (ICTSD 
Reporting, 2011; IP WATCH, 2011). 
Pharmaceutical companies in developed countries then 
obtained those sample viruses from WHO, patented 
them, as well as the vaccines developed from them, 
which they sold at prices unaffordable to developing 
countries. As a result, many people in developing 
countries died from the H5N1 virus because they could 
afford the high costs of the vaccines. Indonesia 
challenged that arrangement as it provided no benefit 
sharing, access to vaccines or transfer of technology. 
Under the new Agreement, pharmaceutical companies 
offered to pay 50% of the costs of administering the 
global influenza monitoring scheme and to supply 10% of 
vaccines and ARVs to developing countries (ICTSD 
Reporting, 2011; IP WATCH, 2011) Although this is good 
step forward, these commitments are far too little in 
meeting the needs of developing countries that constitute 
a greater part of the global population (Third World 
Network, 2011). Developing countries should, therefore, 
campaign to have these targets increased. 
It should be recalled that, on the very important issue of 
compliance, Article 15 clearly requires user countries to 
establish mandatory compliance measures that are 
“effective, appropriate or proportionate.” The Article, 
however, fails to clarify the criteria for determining such a 
standard. An option for developing countries is to seek 
appropriate clarification from the COP/MOP. Alternative-
ly, they can spell out clearly in their domestic law what 
would constitute such a standard, and on that basis, 
refuse access to users whose home countries have not 
adopted measures, which meet that standard (Nijar, 
2011). 
Norway provides an example of how user countries 
may implement this obligation.  According to the Nature 
Diversity Act No, 100, Section 60 (2009), the importation 
into Norway of any genetic material requiring consent can 
be done only if that consent has been obtained. In case 
of any violation, Norway may sue the offender on behalf 
of the party requiring the consent (Nijar, 2011). Under the 
Protocol, user countries are obliged to cooperate where 
the law of a provider country on access and benefit 
sharing has been violated. The provider country can seek 
a remedy against the offender, and the country where 
that offending user is located has a duty to cooperate. 
Any refusal to cooperate must be justified, otherwise that 
could constitute an act of non-compliance with the 









COP/MOP (Nijar, 2011). 
To ensure compliance and monitor the use of biological 
resources, Article 17 of the Protocol requires Members to 
establish checkpoints. Developed or user countries are 
hesitant in implementing this provision. Developing 
countries can induce compliance by providing in their 
domestic laws that access will be denied to users whose 
home countries have failed to establish effective 
checkpoints. User countries that have established 
checkpoints, for example IP Offices, must clearly identify 
same to the provider countries. There must also be 
mandatory disclosure of the use of biological resources, 
origin, consent, and equitable benefit sharing 
arrangements through the tendering of an appropriate 
international certificate as provided for under the Protocol 
(Nijar, 2011). 
Moreover, although under the Protocol checkpoints 
may refuse to furnish information received on grounds of 
confidentiality, developing countries should strive to limit 
what could qualify as “confidential” information. They can 
seek guidance from Article 21 of the Cartagena Protocol, 
and enact similar provisions in their domestic law. Under 
the Cartagena Protocol, a Living Modified Organism 
(LMO) exporting party who claims confidential information 
must justify it. The importing party may deny such a 
claim, with due regard to specified safeguards. In 
addition, under the Cartagena Protocol some forms of 
information are excluded from confidentiality claims 
(Nijar, 2011). 
As indicated earlier, Article 18 of the Nagoya Protocol 
requires user countries to ensure that provider countries 
get access to justice in their judicial system, where the 
terms on which access was granted have been breached. 
Since the benefit sharing agreement is a contract, 
provider countries can sue the user in his home country. 
Although, the precise scope of this provision was the 
subject of a fierce debate between developed and 
developing countries during the negotiation of the 
protocol, useful insights into its meaning could be gained 
from the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making, and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (Nijar, 2011). 
That Convention makes it clear that, “access to justice” 
encompasses the duty to provide affordable legal or 
administrative means to seek redress at affordable costs 
against violations of domestic law, as provided for under 
Article 18(2). The terms also permits a broad array of 
other interested parties, such as indigenous communities, 
and NGOs to challenge such breaches of the domestic 
law of a provider country, whether in court, or before an 
impartial independent body. Developing countries may 
clarify this in their domestic law, or seek a confirmation 
from the COP/MOP (Nijar, 2011).  






Biological resources and TK are of immense importance 
to indigenous communities. They provide food, and 
medicine, just as they generate employment and income 
for those communities. They also serve as a source of 
cultural pride and identity. Biopiracy, spurred by IPRs and 
modern biotechnology, threatens to undermine these 
benefits. The internationally agreed CBD is, therefore, 
justified in that it attempts to provide a bulwark against 
this situation, and to help indigenous communities regain 
some control by imposing prior informed consent and the 
equitable sharing of benefits on mutually agreed terms, 
as conditions for access. 
Whilst indigenous communities would doubtlessly 
continue to confront biopiracy, they can, at least, assert 
more control over their resources, stipulate conditions for 
access and monitor infringements. State sovereignty over 
biological resources and associated TK, as established 
by the CBD, also strengthens the standing of indigenous 
communities in any challenge mounted against  the 
holders of patents, plant breeders’ rights, or any other 
related rights, which have been acquired illegitimately 
through biopiracy and bio-laundering. These instruments 
open the way for them to seek appropriate remedies. 
Surely, the CBD has its limitations, as has been pointed 
out. The Nagoya Protocol attempts to address some of 
those limitations, although it too has its own short-
comings, especially since it was largely based on 
compromises. Still, the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol are 
important steps in the safeguarding of the biological 
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